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SEED WARS: BIOTECHNOLOGY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE 
QUEST FOR HIGH YIELD SEEDS 
Abstract: Presently, intellectual property law is the mechanism that deter-
mines international protection and control over biotech innovations in 
plant varieties and the genetic resources that form the basis for those inno-
vations. The intellectual property paradigm that is utilized employs western 
definitions of property in order to provide a framework in which to allocate 
rights. This has resulted in serious distributive problems: western-specific 
ideas about property, authorship, and individual creative inventors do not 
translate well to areas where cultural knowledge or generational innovation 
form the basis of important societal achievements. The default solution in 
the international agricultural context has been to almost entirely forego any 
sort of property protection for cultural and indigenous knowledge and in-
novation. Until international intellectual property law increases awareness 
of the importance of the public domain in preserving genetic diversity, pro-
tecting the global food supply, and safe-guarding genetic resources, intellec-
tual property law will under-value and under-compensate the contributions 
and agricultural concerns of the developing countries that safeguard the 
vast majority of the world's plant genetic resources. 
INTRODUCTION 
From the time people first began cultivating and harvesting ce-
real grains, plants and their products have been a necessary compo-
nent of the material foundations upon which human societies are 
formed. l We all need to eat, and what we eat, whether it be steak or 
1 See JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000, at 1 (1988). Dates vary on when humans first began 
to cultivate crops. The general estimates fall between ten and fifteen thousand years ago. 
See SHELDON KRIMSKY & ROGER P. WRUBEL, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 9 (1996); H. Garrison Wilkes, Plnnt Genetic Resources over Ten Thousand Years: 
From a Handful of Seed to the Crop-Specific Mega-Gene Banks, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 67, 68 (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 
1988). Wilkes writes: 
The change from being wild to domesticate is characterized more accurately 
as a process than as an event. And the transition from being a wild plant to 
being a plant dependent on humans has not been uniform among useful 
plants. There is not an origin of cultivated plants; rather, there are origins for 
each crop. Some are ancient, others are recent domesticates of this century. 
285 
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tofu or chocolate cake, is ultimately derived from plant materia1.2 
Plants provide us not only with food, but also with the raw materials 
required for the production of innumerable goods from cotton T-
shirts, to automobile tires, to life-saving drugs.3 Since agriculture be-
gan over lO,OOO years ago, human beings have selectively bred plants 
and animals in order to create stronger, healthier, higher yielding or-
ganisms.4 
Selective plant breeding is accomplished by choosing seeds with 
the most desirable traits from each year's harvest in the hope that the 
desired characteristics of the selected parent will surface in its off-
spring.5 Thus, over thousands of years the steady accumulation of de-
sirable genes has produced more productive plants.6 In the last two 
decades, scientists have been able to engage in a more specific form 
of crop selection by isolating genetic material of organisms and induc-
ing specific modifications so that the plants carry and reproduce de-
sired genetic traits such as resistance to pesticides, higher nutritional 
content, and improved appearance.7 These biotechnological innova-
tions pose large ramifications for agriculture-for farmers, seed com-
panies, and consumers.s 
Seeds reproduce themselves almost indefinitely and thus do not 
lend themselves to commodification.9 Because seeds are not easily 
commodified, two things have remained true until the latter part of 
this century: the genetics of most major crop plants have been re-
garded as common heritage, and little private investment has been 
made in plant and crop improvement.10 In this century, there have 
been technological routes, such as hybridization, taken towards com-
modification of the seed.ll There also have been legalistic routes, 
See id. at 67-68. 
2 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 1, at 1. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. at 1-2; David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Pr&jJerty PUr 
tections for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for Agricul-
.ture, 27 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 83, 83 (1995). Note that while "agriculture" encompasses 
both livestock animals and plants, this Note focuses on biotechnological developments in 
plants, e.g., fruits, vegetables, and seed crops. Any reference to "agriculture" or "agricul-
tural biotechnology" should be read in this limited sense. 
5 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 1, at 2. 
6 See id. 
7 See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 83-84. 
8 See id. 
9 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
10 See generally id. 
11 See id. at 11. 
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such as the granting of property rights to plant varieties and, more 
recently, utility patent protection to certain "new" plant varieties. I2 
The almost infinite reproduction of the seed, however, has always 
posed a problem for its ultimate commodification: not all plant varie-
ties-especially crops-are able to be hybridized, and even patented 
plants have numerous offspring. I3 
In recent years, advances in biotechnology have allowed for in-
creased commodification of seeds not only by relying on utility patent 
protection for bioengineered varieties, but also by taking a new route 
to commodification-through biotechnical processes that, among 
other things, render seeds sterile or insert easily recognizable 
"marker" genes that identifY plants' DNA strains as the intellectual 
property of various biotech firms.14 The translation of these innova-
tions into the international realm of global trade and property protec-
tion has been awkward and at times controversiaP5 Nevertheless, in-
tellectual property law seems to be the framework under which 
international protection and control of genetic resources will be dis-
cussed and decided. I6 
Part I of this Note describes the commodification of the seed and 
the history of the United States' intellectual property protections for 
plant varieties. Part II discusses the emergence of biotech crops and 
the biotech market, on the one hand, and international intellectual 
property protections for biotech innovations, on the other. Concern-
ing the latter, the Note focuses on two international agreements: the 
Biodiversity Treaty and the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) component of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT). Part III concludes with an analysis of the structure of intel-
lectual property law and an examination of the serious distributive 
problems this intellectual property structure causes in terms of inter-
national agriculture and the global food supply. The Note concludes 
by advocating for an increased awareness of the importance of the 
public domain and for diminishing the strength of intellectual prop-
erty protection for plants by lowering the number of years patents ex-
tend protection. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 See Michael Pollan, Playing God in the Garden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998 § 6 (maga-
zine), at 44. 
15 See Charles McManis, The Inf(ff/ace Behveen Int(ffnational Intellectual PrOP(ffty and Envi-
mnrrumtalProtection: Biodillersity and Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 255, 255-56 (1998). 
16 See gen(ffally id. 
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I. THE COMMODIFICATION OF SEED & THE UNITED STATES' 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS FOR PLANT VARIETIES 
A. Commodification of Seed 
1. Routes to Commodification 
The natural characteristic of the seed-that it is used in produc-
tion and then re-emerges in multitudinous replacement of the origi-
nal seed-constitutes a biological barrier to its commodification.17 As 
long as a farmer can purchase seed of an improved plant variety and 
thereafter propagate the seed indefinitely for future use, there is little 
reason for capital to engage in plant breeding to develop superior 
crop varieties.l8 During this century, private plant breeding has been 
responsible for several routes taken towards commodifying the seed 
industry by controlling the natural reproductive characteristics of the 
seed.19 Hybridization, which drastically lowers yield in the second and 
subsequent generations, has been one technological route towards 
commodification and the increase in private resource investment in 
plant breeding.2o An alternate, legalistic route has been the granting 
of property rights to privately developed plant varieties through such 
mechanisms as the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA), the Plant Variety 
Protection Act (PVPA) , and utility patents. 21 Recently a third route 
towards the privatization and commodification of plant breeding has 
emerged in the form of a patented biotechnological innovation that 
renders seeds sterile after the first planting, thus definitively control-
ling the seed's ability to reproduce and the farmer's ability to re-
plant.22 
2. International Commodification & Germplasm Flow 
Scientific and technical development in plant improvement has 
increasingly led to the privatization and commodification of the seed 
market. Almost all of this development has taken place within the 
17 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
18 See id. at 11. 
'19 See id. 
20 See id. 
2.1 See Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1988 & Supp. 1996); Plant Variety Protection 
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988 & Supp. 1996). 
22 See Leora Broydo, A Seedy Business, Mother Jones Online (Apr. 7, 1998) <http:/ / 
\V\\-w.motherjones.com/ news_wire /broydo.html> . 
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context of the world market and the transfer of germplasm23 from the 
Third World to the First World.24 The developed countries of the 
North are notably gene-poor in their plant varieties, while almost 
every crop of economic importance has originated in the gene-rich 
developing countries of the Southern Hemisphere.25 The quantitative 
flow of germplasm from the gene-rich countries to the gene-poor is 
immensely disproportionate.26 There is, however, an added character 
to the germplasm flow. Third World germplasm has generally been 
thought of as a free good, part of the cultural commons and the 
common heritage of humankind.27 As a free good, germplasm has 
been liberally appropriated by the developed countries with no direct 
remuneration to the Third World countries from which the germ-
plasm is taken.28 The final consequence of this appropriation occurs 
when plant varieties that include genetic material originally obtained 
from the Third World are returned back to the developing countries' 
markets, appearing there now as high-priced commodities, usually 
with the strict intellectual property protections afforded such prod-
uctS. 29 
3. International Control of the Market for Genetically Engineered 
Seeds 
Genetically engineered seed products, which are the final result 
of Third World germ plasm flow, are primarily controlled by large in-
ternational seed companies.3o These global corporations have posi-
tioned themselves in a biotech market that has immense potential-
Merrill Lynch estimates the global market for genetically engineered 
seeds is set to grow from $450 million US in 1995 to $6.6 billion in 
2005.31 In mid-199B, the top ten largest seed companies controlled 
23 Germplasm is the genetic information encoded in the seed and the raw material 
used by the plant breeder. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 1, at 14. 
24 See id. at 9, 14. 
25 See id. at 14. Of crops of economic importance, only sunflower, blueberry, cranberry, 
and Jerusalem artichoke originated in North America. See id. at 50. 
26 See id. at 15. 
27 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 1, at 15. 
28 See id; McManis, supra note 15, at 268. 
29 See id. 
30 See Cath Blackledge, Life Sciences Firms Will Make Money By Controlling the Whole Food 
Chain, EUROPEAN, May 18, 1998, at 20; RAFI Communique, Seed Industry Consolidation: Who 
owns Whom? (July 1998) <www.rafi.org/web/allpub-display.shtml?pfl=com-list-all.param> 
[hereinafter RAFI Communique]. 
31 See Cath Blackledge, supra note 30, at 20. The Rural Advancement Foundation In-
ternational (RAFJ) cites an equally large estimate from the International Seed Federation 
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30% of the seed trade worldwide ($7 billion US in trade in both bio-
tech and non-biotech seeds),32 and the industry is quickly consolidat-
ing as companies compete to seize control of a lucrative global mar-
ket. 33 For an example of just how attractive this market is, look to the 
American company Monsanto, the new technological front-runner in 
the seed market and, in 1998, the second largest seed company in the 
world.34 In 1997 and 1998, Monsanto spent $6.7 billion US, position-
ing itself to become a top giant in what is now being called the "life 
sciences" industry.35 Biotech innovation in agriculture and the con-
solidation of the biotech market have brought intense competition to 
the seed industry.36 As a result, companies are fighting legal battles 
over the right to use germplasm with desirable traits in breeding and 
are seeking increasingly broader and stronger intellectual property 
rights in order to protect their research investment and plant innova-
tions. 37 
B. Intellectual Property Rights in the United States 
1. The Policies Behind Patents 
Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants pat-
ents to inventors "[tJo promote the Progress of Science and useful 
that the world market for genetically engineered seeds is expected to reach $2 billion by 
the year 2000 and $20 billion by 2010. See RAFI Communique, supra note 30. An article in 
the New York Times describes some analysts' prediction that "[Clontrol of genetic re-
sources, the raw material for biotechnology, will be to the next century what oil and metal 
were to this one." See Michael Pollack, U.S. Sidetracks Pact to Control Gene Splicing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1999, at AI. 
32 See RAFI Communique, supra note 30. In specific seed markets corporate market 
share may be much higher. See RAFI Communique, The Gene Giants: Update on Consolodation 
in the Life Industry, (Mar. 1999) <www.rafi.org/web/allpub-display.shtml?pfl+com-list-
all.param>. For example, in 1999, fOlll' companies controlled 69% of the North American 
seed corn market, and five vegetable seed companies controlled 75% of the global vegeta-
ble seed market. See id. 
33 See Scott Kilman & Susan Warren, Dupont, Monsanto Going to Seed, WALL ST. j., May 
28,1998, at C7. 
34 See RAFl Communique, supra note 30. Seed industry mergers are occurring at a 
breakneck pace, and the largest corporations continue to reposition themselves. See id. In 
1998, the top three life industry giants were Pion eel' Hi-Bred International (U.S.), Mon-
santo/ American Home Products (U.S.), and Swiss giant Novartis. See id. 
35 See Kilman & Warren, supra note 33. 
36 See Peter J. Goss, Guiding the Hand that Feeds: Towards Socially Optimal Aj)propriability in 
Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1395, 1398 (1996); Kilman & Warren, 
supra note 33. 
37 See Goss, supra note 36, at 1398. 
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Arts .... "38 A patent is an exclusive right granted to an inventor to 
prevent all others from making, using, and/or selling the patented 
invention.39 The rationale of the patent system is to establish a form of 
protection that provides incentive to research, development, and in-
novation.4o Patents provide an incentive to invent because they permit 
inventors to exclude others from using newly developed technology, 
and in so doing, allow inventors to make profits and recoup research 
expenses and development costs.41 Additionally, it is thought that pat-
ents facilitate the dissemination of technical information which, if not 
protected by patents, would likely be kept secret.42 
However, patents exert a negative cost on society as well: the 
more costly and restricted the access to information protected by pat-
ents, the more inefficient the market.43 Conceptually, the idea of pat-
ents is antithetical to the concept of a liberal democracy founded on 
the ideal of public discourse and free access to, and transmission of, 
information.44 In the United States and countries with similar intellec-
tual property systems, patent protection draws the line between pro-
tected information and information that will circulate in what is 
called the public commons-that realm of information that all people 
contribute to, and extract from, in creating ideas, language, and so-
cial structure.45 Thus, intellectual property rights set conceptual 
boundaries between the public and private domains, and in so doing, 
extend protection to areas of creation and thought that seem 
infinite.46 Because we think of creativity as flowing from a universe of 
infinite possibilities, there is a tendency to systematically increase in-
tellectual property protection.47 But, as Keith Aoki notes, the expan-
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
39 See F.H. Erbisch & C. Velazquez, Introduction to Intellectual Properties, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 3, 8 (F.H. Erbisch & K.M. Maredia 
eds., 1998). There are three types of patents granted in the United States: plant patents, 
utility patents, and design patents. See id. Plant and utility patents will be discussed in this 
Note. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text. 
40 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE Doc-
TRINES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 16 (1997). 
41 See id.; Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 86-87. 
42 See id. 
43 SeeJAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAw AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY xii (1996). 
44 See id. The First Amendment is one of the most obvious examples of this ideal. See id. 
45 See Keith Aoki, Neo-colonialism, Anticommons Property and Biopiracy in the (Not-So Brave) 
New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
11,34-35 (1998). 
46 See id. at 35. 
47 See id. 
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sion of intellectual property protections "make[s] us ignore the com-
mon-sense knowledge that new intellectual creations are formed from 
pre-existing thoughts and ideas in a long chain stretching back into 
antiquity. "48 In other words, patent everything and there is no longer 
any common material from which to create.49 Economically, when too 
many owners hold the right of exclusion-through patents or other 
means-then underuse and underutilization of the resource occurs.50 
If this phenomenon were to occur in the global food market, the 
dangers are clear: over-protection of high-yield seeds could severely 
limit farmers' ability to plant the most desirable crops as well as farm-
ers' and seed companies' ability to breed future generations of 
seeds.51 The result would be the underutilization of genetic resources 
that have been in the cultural commons for over 10,000 years. 
2. United States Patents for Plants and Living Organisms 
The "utility patent" statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101, provides seventeen-
year patent protection for "[w]ho[m]ever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."52 Until 1970, the 
Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) contained the only intellectual prop-
erty rights available to protect new inventions that contained living 
matter.53 The PPA enabled plant breeders to obtain patent-like pro-
tection for their inventions but limited the protection to asexually re-
producing plants (produced from cuttings or grafts but not grown 
from seed).54 In 1970, Congress enacted the Plant Variety Protection 
Act (PVPA) to protect breeding innovations in sexually reproducing 
plants, thereby including most crops.55 The PVPA provides patent-like 
protection for new, distinct, uniform, and stable plant varieties for 
48Id. 
49 See id. 
50 See Aoki, supra note 45, at 35. 
51 See generally id. 
52 35 U.S.c. § 101 (1994). Until 1980 and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, utility patents were 
not extended to living matter. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 95-96. 
53 See Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.c. § 161 (1988 & Supp. 1996). 
54 The PPA grants that 'Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any 
distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly 
found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated 
state, may obtain a patent therefor .... » 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1996). 
55 See 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988 & Supp. 1996); David Tilford, Saving the Blueprints: The In-
ternational Legal Regime for Plant Resources, 30 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 373, 402 (1998). 
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twenty years.56 The protection the PVPA grants IS limited by two 
significant exceptions that have been narrowed in recent years.57 
These exceptions allow breeders to use protected seed to create new 
varieties and allow farmers to save seed from crops grown with the 
protected variety and replant those seeds without compensating the 
protected plant breeder.58 
Today, most biotechnology inventions are filed as utility patents 
and not as plant patents. 59 Instead of only protecting the plant, utility 
patents make protection of plant genes possible, as well as allow the 
breeder to protect the use of the genetic material of a number of 
plants, and to protect for multiple uses such as pharmaceutical, pest 
protection, and herbicide resistance.6o Prior to 1980, the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTa) and the federal courts were reluctant to 
allow utility patents to extend to living matter.61 This practice ended 
56 See 7 U.S.C. § 2401 (a). Plants that do not exhibit the same traits when grown out 
over several generations (i.e., plants that are not stable) are not eligible for protection. See 
7 U.S.C. § 2402 (a) (3). Thus, hybrids are excluded from protection because they do not 
breed true after one generation. SeeGoss, supra note 36, at 1407 n.70. 
57 See Goss, supra note 36, at 1408-09. 
58 See id. The first exception is called the "research exception" and the second the 
"crop exemption" exception. See id. In 1994, Congress passed amendments to the PVPA to 
limit the potential for abuse of both exceptions. See id. at 1409-11. For an example of judi-
cial efforts to limit the scope of the crop exemption, see Delta & Pine Land CO. II. Peoples 
Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1983), which found that farmers who save seed must do so 
individually and not through intermediaries such as farm cooperatives; and Asgrow v. Win-
terboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995), which determined that a farmer could sell to other farmers no 
more than the amount of seed the farmer would otherwise need to plant her crop for the 
next year. Congress has now removed any sale provision from the crop exemption-pres-
ently farmers can only sell seed for other than reproductive purposes (food or feed but not 
for planting). SeeGoss, supra note 36, at 1414. 
59 See Erbisch & Velazquez, supra note 39, at 9. Although note that because plant pat-
ents are not available for sexually reproducing plants, and utility patents are often very 
expensive and difficult to obtain, the PVPA is often still an attractive option. See Goss, supra 
note 36, at 1414. 
60 See Erbisch & Velazquez, supra note 39, at 9. The PVPA does not provide adequate 
protection for a breeder who has inserted a new gene into a plant variety because it allows 
another breeder to purchase the genetically altered, and PVPA protected, plant and breed 
the new gene into a new variety. See John H. Barton, Acquiring Protection for Improved Germ-
plasm and Inbred Lines, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECH-
NOLOGY 19, 22 (F.H. Erbisch & K.M. Maredia eds., 1998). 
61 See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 95. Scalise and Nugent write: 
Despite anomalous patents, sllch as that issued to Louis Pasteur in 1873 for 
his purified culture of yeast, the courts invariably rejected patents that per-
tained to living matter. The most effective weapon was the products of nature 
doctrine, as discllssed in the American Fruit Growers case. When that doc-
trine failed, the PTO and private plaintiffs relied upon the plant protection 
acts of 1930 and 1970 as evidence that Congress intended that only living or-
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when, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
the patentability of living inventions.62 Chakrabarty, a microbiologist, 
challenged a denial of his patent application for a bacterium he in-
vented that broke down crude oi1.63 The Court held that Chak-
rabarty's bacterium was a product of human labor, contained charac-
teristics "markedly different" from any found in nature, and showed 
the potential for "significant utility," thus making Chakrabarty'S bacte-
rium eligible for a patent.64 
Although Chakrabarty was the groundbreaking case, the question 
remained of whether the PTO and courts would grant patents that 
extended protection to complex living organisms such as plants or 
animals.65 In Ex parte Hibberd, the PTO originally rejected Hibberd's 
application for a patent on a maize plant that possessed an extremely 
high level of amino acids, determining that the existence of the PVPA 
indicated that plants do not qualify for standard utility patents.66 The 
PTO's Board reversed the decision and held that "neither the PPA 
nor the PVPA expressly excludes any biological subject matter from 
protection under Section 101 [utility patents]."67 Thus, new plant va-
rieties became eligible for utility patents under Ex parte Hibberd.68 
II. DISCUSSION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIOTECH 
CROPS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
A. The Emergence of Biotech Crops 
In 1998, the fourth year that genetically altered seeds have been 
on the market, about 45 million acres of U.S. farmland have been 
planted with biotech cropS.69 Most of these crops are corn, soybeans, 
See id. 
ganisms qualifying under one of the acts were to be afforded intellectual 
property rights. 
62 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
63 See id. at 305. 
64 See id. at 310. The court also examined the committee reports of the 1952 re-
codification of the patent laws which, in the court's view, made c1eal' Congress's intent that 
the statute include "anything under the sun that is made by man." Id. at 309. 
65 See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 98. 
66 See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444 (1985). 
67 See id. at 444-45. 
68 See Goss, supra note 36, at 1405. 
69 See Pollan, supra note 14. One estimate is that about half of U.S. cotton fields, 40% 
of soybean fields, and 20% of corn fields were genetically altered in 1998. See Kilman & 
Warren, supra note 33, at C7. 
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cotton, and potatoes that have been engineered to either produce 
their own pesticides or withstand herbicides.70 Through genetic engi-
neering, breeders are able to bring qualities from many living organ-
isms into the genome of the plant.71 For instance, it is possible to take 
a flounder gene that permits the fish to tolerate the extreme cold of 
the deep ocean and insert it into a strawberry plant to induce frost 
tolerance.72 Other examples include inserting genes for disease resis-
tance taken from viruses and a gene from a bacterium, Bacillus thur-. 
ingiensis, that causes a plant to produce a protein harmless to hu-
mans but toxic to many pests.73 Biotechnology is also instrumental in 
creating "end-use-tailored" varieties such as cotton of a certain color, 
soybeans with a specific oil content, or corn with high energy content 
that is especially useful for livestock feed. 74 
The great hope for genetically engineered crops is that they will 
feed the world.75 Globally, there are 80 million new people to feed 
each year, while growth in world grain production has slowed from 
3% per year in the 1970s to 1 % per year over the last decade.76 Bio-
tech crops offer a potential answer to the great fear that with bur-
geoning populations the occurrence of mass starvation is only a mat-
ter of time.77 Hopes for genetically engineered crops include crops 
with immunity to insects, disease, drought, pesticides, and herbicides, 
as well as crops with substantially higher yields and nutritional con-
tent.78 Higher yields and disease resistance are attractive not only be-
cause they increase the world's food supply but also for purely eco-
nomic reasons: farmers who choose a higher yield, more disease 
resistant seed will bring more goods to the market.79 Additionally, 
some think genetic engineering offers ecologically sound alternatives 
70 See Pollan, supra note 14. 
71 See id. 
72 See id.; Michael Specter, Europe, Bucking Trend in U.S., Blocks Genetically Altered Food, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1998, at AI. 
73 See Goss, supra note 36, at 1401; Pollan, supra note 14. 
74 Goss, supra note 36, at 1401-02; See Monsanto, (visited Jan. 19,2000) <http://www. 
monsanto.com/ ag/ _asp/monsanto.asp>. 
75 See Christopher Hallowell et aI., Will the World Go Hungry? The Population Will Hit 10 
Billion, But Farmers Can Meet the Challenge with Modern Biotechnology and a Little Bit of Ancient 
Wisdom, TIME INT'L, Nov. 1, 1997. 
76 See id. The world population growth rate has also decreased from a high of 2.2% in 
1963 to 1.4% today. See id. 
77 See id. 
78 SeeJimmy Carter, Whos Afraid of Genetic Engineering?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1998, at 
A2I. 
79 See Goss, supra note 36, at 1400. 
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to today's herbicide and pesticide rich agriculture by replacing ex-
pensive and toxic chemical inputs with expensive but apparently be-
nign genetic information.8o 
Many people have also raised serious concerns about the impact 
genetically engineered crops-generally protected by strict intellec-
tual property laws-will have on agriculture around the world.81 Envi-
ronmental fears have focused on the possibility of genetic erosion-
the depletion of the genetic gene pool-caused by increased intellec-
tual property rights that restrict access to genetic resources.82 Genetic 
erosion holds two potentially serious dangers: extinction and genetic 
uniformity.83 The extinction of a species means its genes are lost along 
with any beneficial traits it might contain.84 The ramification of ex-
tinction is that remaining plants are unable to appropriate those lost 
beneficial characteristics that might help them ward off disease and 
pests.85 Genetic uniformity-the genetic similarity in varieties used to 
produce a crop-is another concern.86 When crops are genetically 
similar, they react similarly to drought, disease, insects, and other fac-
tors, thus increasing the likelihood of large-scale crop' failure. 87 Eco-
nomic fears center on the increased productivity and economies of 
scale created in corporate farming by biotechnological innovation 
that may make less efficient family and subsistence farmers unable to 
compete.88 Additionally, there is the concern that intellectual prop-
erty rights protecting biotech plant engineers will increase economic 
concentration in the seed industry, leading to higher seed costs and 
the disintegration of small farms.89 
80 See Pollan, supra note 14. 
81 See Aoki, supm note 45, at 47. 
82 See Pollan, supra note 14. 
83 See Goss, supm note 36, at 1402-03. 
84 See id. at 1402. Kloppenburg writes of "the need to address the global erosion of ge-
netic diversity, because that which is being lost is the raw material out of which responses 
to future pest and pathogen challenges must be fashioned and with which the broadening 
of the crop genetic base can be accomplished." KLOPPENBURG, supra note 1, at 163. 
85 See Goss, supra note 36, at 1402. Note, however, that although biotechnology cannot 
create genetic traits after the loss of a species, it can help prevent extinction by numerically 
increasing failing species or inserting greater disease resistance into endangered plant 
species. See id. at 1402-03. 
86 See id. at 1403. 
87 See id. Genetic uniformity exacerbated the Irish potato famine and the 1970 corn 
leaf blight in the United States. Seeid. 
88 See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 84-85. 
89 See Goss, supm note 36, at 1399. 
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B. Intellectual Property Rights in the International Context 
Both the advantages and disadvantages of biotech crops must be 
interpreted in the international context where agricultural progress 
and exchange has traditionally taken place. The debate over biotech-
nology has begun to take place internationally in order to encompass 
adequately issues like global genetic diversity, the continued viability 
of important land races, north-south seed trade and appropriation, 
and industrial and rural agricultural concerns.90 The international 
community now acknowledges that world-wide cooperation in bio-
technology trade and global genetic diversity is necessary in order to 
respond to the varied concerns of a number of key constituencies: 
industry, First and Third world farmers, indigenous people, nations, 
environmentalists, scientists, and First and Third world consumers.91 
In the area of biodiversity and biotech crops, much of the interna-
tional debate has taken place in the area of intellectual property law 
or under the aegis of trade agreements.92 
There is no unifying system of international commercial law and, 
particularly, no unifYing system of intellectual property or patent 
law.93 Thus for an inventor who would like to pursue patent protec-
tion outside of the United States, thousands of dollars are required 
per jurisdiction in filing costs and attorney's fees without the guaran-
tee that a patent will be granted.94 In the realm of biodiversity, plant 
biotechnology, and the granting or withholding of intellectual prop-
erty rights, as in most areas of international trade debate, there is 
sharp conflict between the interests of the technology-rich industrial 
countries of the North and those of the biodiversity-rich developing 
countries of the South.95 In the legal realm of intellectual property 
rights the debate can be couched in fairly general terms. Developed 
countries want their technological innovations and investments to be 
granted strong intellectual property rights in developing countries to 
protect against piracy and to insure monetary return on their invest-
90 See United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 103-20 (1993) [hel'einafter Biodiversity Treaty]; General Agl'eement on Tariffs and 
Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Countel'feit Goods, 
Dec. 15,1993, 331.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
91 See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 90; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 90. 
92 See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 90; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 90. 
93 See McManis, supra note IS, at 265; Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 105. 
94 See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 105. 
95 See generally McManis, supra note IS, at 255. 
298 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 23:285 
ments.96 Developing countries would prefer to modifY the present sys-
tem of free appropriation of genetic resources from gene-rich coun-
tries with a system of intellectual property rights that support and 
promote the fair and equitable sharing of benefits that arise from the 
utilization and development of genetic resources.97 Additionally, de-
veloping countries are concerned that intellectual property law favors 
technological innovation that has emerged from the industrialized 
countries and disfavors farmers in developing countries who, over 
generations, have contributed to and improved plant species.98 The 
criticism is that traditional agricultural innovation-taking place for 
thousands of years in the gene-rich developing countries-which has 
preserved species and contributed to genetic diversity is inimical to 
the "innovation," "novelty," and "inventiveness" requirements that in-
tellectual property law demands when granting protection.99 
C. International Treaties 
There have been a number of international treaties and agree-
ments regarding trade and intellectual property rights,loo The most 
pertinent recent treaties addressing the area of biotechnology and 
biodiversity are the United Nations Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (Biodiversity Treaty) and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs), part of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs' (GATT) Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations,lol 
1. Biodiversity Treaty 
In 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil was the site of the global conven-
tion on biodiversity.102 The three stated objectives of the Biodiversity 
Treaty are (1) the conservation of biological diversity, (2) the sustain-
able use of biological components, and (3) the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic re-
sources through (a) appropriate access to genetic resources, (b) ap-
propriate transfer of relevant technologies, and (c) appropriate fund-
96 See id. at 268-69. 
97 See id. at 269. 
98 See id. at 268-69. 
99 See id. 
100 See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 90; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 90. 
101 See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 90; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 90. 
102 See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 90. 
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ing.103 Although the United States, under the Bush administration, 
did not sign the treaty-in large part due to concerns about adequate 
protection of U.S. intellectual property law and biotechnology inter-
ests10L-162 other nations did sign the treaty, and it was ratified by the 
requisite number of nations, entering into effect on December 29, 
1993.105 
The United States' objection to the treaty largely centered on the 
vague language of Article 16 which addresses what constitutes appro-
priate access to, and transfer of, technology.106 Article 16, entitled 
"Access to and Transfer of Technology," attempts to mollify both 
Northern and Southern concerns.107 Paragraph 1 of Article 16 begins: 
Each Contracting Party, recognizing that technology in-
cludes biotechnology, and that both access to and transfer of 
technology among Contracting Parties are essential elements 
for the attainment of the objectives of this Convention, un-
dertakes subject to the provisions of this Article to provide 
and/ or facilitate access for and transfer to other Contracting 
Parties of technologies that are relevant to ... biological di-
versity or make use of genetic resources. 
Paragraph 2 provides for favorable transfer of biotechnology to 
developing countries, yet modifies that provision with "terms that are 
consistent with intellectual property rightS:"108 
Access to and transfer of technology referred to in para-
graph 1 ... to developing countries shall be provided and/ 
or facilitated under fair and most favourable terms, includ-
ing on concessional and preferential terms where mutually 
agreed .... In the case of technology subject to patents and 
other intellectual property rights, such access and transfer 
shall be provided on terms which recognize and are consis-
tent with the adequate and effective protection of intellec-
tual property rights. 
103 See id. art. 1. 
104 See McManis, supra note 15, at 256; Tilford, supra note 55, at 418. President Bush, in 
a speech at the Rio Convention, voiced U.S. concerns, saying, "[The Convention] threat-
ens to retard biotechnology and undermine the protection of ideas." FIONA MCCONNELL, 
THE BIODIVERSITY CONVENTION A NEGOTIATING HISTORY III (1996). 
105 See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 110. 
106 See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 90, art. 16; Tilford, supra note 55, at 417. 
107 See Tilford, supra note 55, at 419. 
108 Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 90, art. 16, 'l[ 2. 
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Paragraph 5 seems to assert that intellectual property rights should be 
revised if they run counter to the goals of the treaty: 109 
The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other 
intellectual property rights may have an influence on the 
implementation of this Convention, shall cooperate in this 
regard subject to national legislation and international law 
in order to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do 
not run counter to its objectives. llo 
The United States' reluctance to sign the treaty was influenced by 
biotech industry concerns stemming mainly from the fear that tech-
nology transfer under the Biodiversity Treaty may call for transfer that 
does not require full payment by the transferee for use of the tech-
nology.ll1 In contrast, the developing countries requested preferential 
transfer of technology in order to reduce the payment demanded of 
them for receipt of the technologies. ll2 As David Tilford writes of this 
conflict: 'The South wants the technology and the North wants the 
South to have it. But while the South sees itself as a potential partner, 
the North looks south and sees only paying customers."1l3 In response 
to business and global concerns, the Clinton Administration has sub-
mitted the signed treaty to Congress for approval, accompanied by a 
letter of interpretation that clarifies the United States' understanding 
of the treaty-particularly of Article 16 and the application of the 
treaty to intellectual property rightS. 1l4 The U.S. letter of interpreta-
tion declares that a company has exclusive rights to its own technol-
ogy, that transfers of technology must be voluntary, and that compul-
sory licensing will be forbidden.1l5 
United States' disapproval of the treaty, as well as the fact that the 
treaty only serves to lay the groundwork for subsequent international 
negotiations, insures that its effect will not be felt by the biotechnol-
109 See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 90, art. 16,11 5; Tilford, supra note 55, at 419. 
110 Biodiversity Treaty, art. 16, 1 5. 
III See Tilford, supra note 55, at 418-20. 
112 See id. at 419. 
'113 See id. 
114 See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 112-13. The Senate must consent for U.S. 
ratification of the treaty. See id. at 113. 
115 See id. at 112-13. The International Community has been unhappy with the letter of 
interpretation criticizing the U.S. for attempting to create the terms it was unable to ob-
tain in the treaty negotiations. See id. at 113. 
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ogy industry in the near future.l16 Commentators have noted that one 
substantial achievement of the treaty is that "for the first time, ... in-
digenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles are 
expressly mentioned ... and their central contributions to biodiver-
sity conservation are recognized."ll7 Final control over many of the 
stipulations in the treaty is left to national determinations and legisla-
tion, leaving a vague precedent-although a potentially empowering 
one for developing countries-upon which future agreements are to 
be modeled. lls 
2. Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement 
Since its inception in 1947-48, the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT) has functioned as a vehicle for implementing 
trade policy.ll9 The most recent round of negotiations sponsored by 
GATT, the Uruguay Round, began in 1986 and was concluded on De-
cember 15, 1993.120 The Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) is the portion of the Uruguay Round that addresses multina-
tional intellectual property rights and, specifically, intellectual prop-
erty protection for plants.I21 
The TRIPs Agreement establishes specific standards on the avail-
ability, scope, and use of intellectual property rights.I 22 Articles 27 (l) 
and 27 (2) are the applicable articles for the area of biotechnology 
and plant varieties protection. Article 27 (1) states that "patents [are] 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive 
step and are capable of industrial application." "All fields of technol-
ogy" is interpreted to include biotechnology, although transitional 
arrangements granted by TRIPs to developing countries and qualify-
116 See id. For instance, an outgrowth of the Biodiversity Treaty, the Biosafety Protocol, 
collapsed in disarray when the United States-influenced once again by the biotech indus-
try-and five other large agricultural exporters rejected a biosafety proposal that had the 
support of approximately 130 other nations. See Pollack, supra note 31, at AI. 
m DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: To-
WARD TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNI-
TIES 103-04 (1996). See particularly Article 8(j) of the Biodiversity Treaty. 
118 See id. at 104; see generally Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 90, arts. 8 (j), 8 (k). 
119 See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 4, at 114. 
120 See id. GATT has sponsored eight rounds of multilateral negotiations relating to tar-
iffs and trade. See id. 
121 See id. Spurred on by a desi1'e to protect against patent violations by developing 
countries, the United States. was originally the main sponsor of TRIPs. See id. 
122 See McManis, supra note 15, at 266. 
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ing provisions in Articles 27(2) and (3) may allow concerned coun-
tries some control in areas where there is strong national or public 
interest,123 For instance, Article 27(2) modifies 27(1): "members may 
exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their ter-
ritory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect 
ordre [sic] public morality, including to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment 
" 
The protection of plant varieties is dealt with specifically in Arti-
cle 27(3), where protection of some form is required: "members shall 
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an 
effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof." The final 
version of this article is different from the draft offered by the United 
States, which asked for mandatory recognition of plant patents in or-
der to bring international standards into line with U.S. policy stem-
ming from Ex parte Hibberd,124 Although the United States' request was 
not fully granted in Article 27 (3), some form of minimum intellectual 
property protection for plant varieties-thus including genetically en-
gineered plants-is required by TRIPs, whether it be through patents 
or a sui generis system,125 Those countries that do not currently allow 
the patenting of plants or agricultural products-India is an exam-
ple-will be obliged to offer some sort of protection for plant varieties 
even if this contradicts national policies.126 
III. ANALYSIS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw AND BIOTECH 
INNOVATIONS-STRUCTURAL FLAWS AND DISTRIBUTIVE INEQUALITIES 
The Biodiversity Treaty and the TRIPs Agreement offer two 
conflicting visions of future global trade in genetic resources: one 
dedicated to strengthening international biodiversity protection, the 
other establishing strong intellectual property protections in order to 
123 See Ruth L. Gana, Prospects fur Dellelaping Countries under the TRIPs Agreement, 29 
VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 735, 753 (1996); McManis, supra note 15, at 266. 
124 See Tilford, supra note 55, at 408. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. at 408-09. From the United States' point of view this means signatories may 
decide to offer separate and perhaps weaker plant variety protection rather than the full 
patent rights advocated by the U.S. See id. at 408. In India, reaction to this provision was so 
vehement that in October 1993 half a million farmers rallied together to protest the pat-
enting of agricultural products. See McManis, supra note 15, at 257, 267. The head of the 
association that organized the protest, M. D. Nanjundaswamy, said the farmers were dem-
onstrating "for collective, not individual control over seeds and plants." See id. 
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promote world trade, including trade in biodiversity.l27 Both treaties 
use intellectual property rights as the foundation for achieving these 
goals.128 The use of intellectual property rights to accomplish arguably 
different international goals (biodiversity protection versus free mar-
ket international trade in biological resources) highlights the pre-
eminent place intellectual property plays, and will play, in interna-
tional attempts to control and regulate plant genetic resources and 
biodiversity.129 
In the area of plant genetic resources, the ideological debate fo-
cuses on the appropriate subject of property rights.13o Although living 
matter has been patentable in the United States since 1980,131 the 
controversy over patentability of living organisms is at the center of 
the conflict over intellectual property rights between developing and 
developed countries.132 This debate is not only about ethical issues 
(should plant life be patented?), but also about legal issues (are bio-
technological patents on plants "new"?), economic issues (how to al-
locate rights between farmers in developing countries and patent-
holders who are usually multinational corporations), and biological 
issues (will increasing use of plant varieties contribute to the denigra-
tion of global genetic diversity?) .133 Although plants and living matter 
seem to be allowed some form of patent protection on the global 
market,134 the solutions to the ethical, economic, legal, and biological 
questions mentioned above are less easily located. The search for 
127 See McManis, supra note 15, at 255. 
128 See inJra notes 100-26 and accompanying text. 
129 As Darrell Posey writes: 
[D]oes anyone have a better mechanism than IPR [intellectual property 
rights] to provoke a new, more socially just and economically sound paradigm 
of "wealth," to strengthen positions of local communities, or to recognize the 
intellectual contribution of indigenous peoples to human patrimony? Alter-
native strategies are welcome and needed. Bllt the deadly serious race to con-
serve biological and cultural diversity of the Planet is on: IPR seems to be one 
of the most interesting intellectual, legal, economic and political tools avail-
able to us at the present. 
Darrell A. Posey, International Agreements and Intellectual Property Right Protection JOT Indigenous 
Peoples, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCE BOOK 
225,226 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994). 
130 See Gana, supra note 123, at 745. 
131 See Diamond v. Chakarbarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
132 See Gana, supra note 123, at 752-53. 
133 See id. at 753. 
134 See Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 90; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 90. 
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these solutions form the crux of the debate between developing and 
developed countries. 
In the legal realm, many have questioned whether the structure 
of intellectual property rights and the western definitions of "prop-
erty" which it uses provide an appropriate framework in which to dis-
cuss and allocate rights for agricultural resources, plant varieties, and 
genetics.135 The intellectual property regime enshrined in TRIPs, and 
to a lesser extent in the Biodiversity Treaty, raises serious questions of 
distributive justice.136 The intellectual property laws cemented in 
TRIPs seem a continuation of United States' intellectual property pol-
icy-allowing little leeway for concerns of developing countries, 
specifically in the area of germplasm and other resource flows, and 
control over economic development. 137 The Biodiversity Treaty, which 
acknowledges the contribution of knowledge and resources from de-
veloping countries, only offers vague language about protecting those 
resources and seems easily hijacked by the interests of industry and 
developed countries.138 Similarly, as James Boyle writes, "On the insti-
tutional level, the GATT has been used both to expound and to en-
force the developed world's view of intellectual property. "139 
The pertinent contention in this debate is that western ways of 
thinking and legislating intellectual property-with the idea of "origi-
nal" and "new" creation by a transformative individual at the center of 
its framework-have been utilized by the West as a "one way valve for 
property claims. "140 As a result, the flow of germ plasm and indigenous 
agricultural knowledge from the Third World to the First has largely 
been an uninterrupted and uncompensated exchange of valuable in-
formation and resources because what comes out of the Third World 
is not, in the legal context, deserving of protection. 141 Vandanna Shiva 
comments on the free flow of information and resources to western 
industry: "At the heart of the GATT treaty and its patent laws is the 
135 See Aoki, supra note 45, at 46. 
136 See VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE (1997). 
137 See BOYLE, supra note 43, at 141; SHIVA, supra note 136. 
138 See POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 117, at 4; infra notes 102-18 and accompanying 
text. The interests of the developing countries are not neutral either. As Posey argues, 
''The Earth Summit [Conference on the Biodiversity Treaty 1 was more of a political game 
to re-divide the world's resources between new global players thim a gathering to address 
the issues of poverty and environmental degradation. Environmentally rich countries want 
to be given as much power as technologically rich countries." See Posey, supra note 129, at 
226. 
139 See BOYLE, supra note 43, at 141. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 141-42. 
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treatment of biopiracy as a natural right of Western corporations, 
necessary for the 'development' of the Third World. "142 
Western countries have pushed for quick adoption of TRIPs to 
protect against Third World piracy of their products which accounts 
for millions of dollars in lost profits. 143 But note, developed countries' 
claim to piracy is an assertion about a certain kind of ideological pi-
racy: that of high-tech innovations in computer programs, CDs, and 
genetic technology, but not the equally acute piracy occurring in the 
opposite direction. l44 The hypocrisy of western demand for intellec-
tual property protections is twofold: not only do developing countries 
pay a high premium for the patent~d products that are reintroduced 
in their countries (yet made from local resources), but developing 
countries are unable to use the intellectual property framework to 
protect against the piracy of their own indigenous and local resources 
and knowledge.145 
The culture-boundedness of our concepts of property seems 
largely responsible for the distributive inequalities in global intellec-
tual property. Shiva sees the western conception of property as the 
modern day colonizer: the West views non-European property as 
"natural" and thereby equates such property with "unowned," thus 
available for discovery and ownership.146 To extend her analogy, the 
freedom transnational corporations claim through intellectual prop-
erty rights in TRIPs is the same freedom European colonizers have 
claimed since 1492-only now instead of land titles, it is the genetic 
code oflife which is being claimed.l47 In less charged language, west-
ern-specific ideas about property and authorship and individual crea-
tive inventors do not translate well to areas where cultural knowledge 
or generational innovation form the basis of important societal 
achievements.148 The default solution in the international context has 
been to almost entirely forego any sort of property protection for cul-
tural and indigenous knowledge and innovation even when it is ex-
actly this knowledge that forms the basis for most biotech patents. 
The distinction intellectual property law makes between different 
kinds of knowledge is at its most obvious in the intellectual property 
142 SeeSHIVA, supra note 136, at 5. 
143 See Aoki, supra note 45, at 49. 
144 See id. 
145 Seeid. at 47-50. 
146 See Aoki, supra note 45, at 50; SH1VA, supra note 136, at 2-5. 
147 See SHIVA, supra note 136, at 2-5. 
148 See id. 
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rights that guard plant genetic resources. Agriculture, more than 
many other areas of industry and creativity, is the product of genera-
tional innovation by farmers who save, share, and combine seeds over 
time and a variety of conditions to attain a constantly adapting prod-
uct that forms the basis of all agricultural crops today. That sort of 
generational innovation has long been thought to be in the public 
domain, as perhaps it ought to be. The discrepancy is that now, with 
genetic engineering, corporations are patenting seeds that are based 
almost entirely (minus one or two genes) on a product created 
through farmers' innovations over many years. 
The policy behind intellectual property law has been directed 
toward achievement of a proper balance between the rights of inven-
tors or authors and of public consumers.149 The increasing privatiza-
tion of plant genetic research and control of biotech crops may sug-
gest a growing imbalance between public and private access to plant 
genetic resources. But the balance (or lack of balance) between pub-
lic and private rights that forms the basis for the paradigm of western 
intellectual property law must also confront the need to protect the 
rights of people who are not inventors or authors, under traditional 
definitions, yet who produce a product that is immensely valuable 
both to consumers and to traditional inventors. The inability of intel-
lectual property law to address this question suggests that a disparity 
exists between its attention to private interests and those of public 
consumers. The de facto solution has been in favor of private, corpo-
rate interests and indicates a growing tendency in intellectual prop-
erty protection towards the support of stronger private property rights 
over the recognition of the need for equitable global management of 
finite resources. 
The advent of sterile "terminator" seeds represents a biological 
means to ensure even stronger protection for biotech products than 
intellectual property law is able to grant. In the past, and at present, 
large seed companies patent their high-yield seeds and sign a contract 
with farmers who promise not to plant the seeds their crops pro-
duce-thus ensuring that farmers will return to the seed company to 
buy next year's seeds.150 However, this arrangement "works only if 
farmers honor it-something that's difficult to police in the U.S. and 
almost impossible to enforce in the developing world. "151 In engineer-
149 See id. 
150 SeeJeffrey Kluger et ai., The Suicide Seeds Terminator genes could mean mg biotech bucks-
but mg trouble too, as a grass-roots protest breaks out on the Net, TIME, Feb. 1, 1999. 
151Id. 
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ing the sterile seeds, corporations are able to combat the weak patent 
protection offered in many developing countries.152 In essence, the 
newly patented sterile seeds enforce biologically what has been impos-
sible to fully enforce contractually or through property rights, and 
they also signal the ultimate commodification of the seed by destroy-
ing its reproductive capabilities. As one critic of the sterile seeds has 
said, "From a marketing perspective, the technology is brilliant. From 
a social perspective, it's pathological. This is a question of who con-. 
troIs the seeds oflife."153 Sterile seeds have the potential to pose disas-
trous results for the global food supply and almost certainly pose 
problems for Third World farmers who rely on saving seeds each year 
in order to replant their fields the following year.154 For intellectual 
property policy, the development of sterile seeds represents one 
method by which those who hold the technology can bypass some of 
the impracticalities of intellectual property law (such as the ability of 
farmers to replant patented seeds) as well as the tedious requirements 
of international trade agreements. Sterile seeds allow corporations to 
make and enforce what is, in essence, their own intellectual property 
law regime, thereby suggesting that our intellectual property law sys-
tem may be growing obsolete. 
Concrete solutions to the many problems described in this Note 
are difficult to locate. The challenge for intellectual property law to-
day is to encompass the competing goals of preserving biodiversity, 
increasing international trade, protecting indigenous interests, and 
facilitating research for improved plant varieties. Given the predomi-
nance of intellectual property law in international law and the 
strength of its support from western nations and corporations, tradi-
tional intellectual property law is likely to continue to serve as the le-
gal guide for trade in global plant genetic resources. As suggested in 
this Note, defaulting to western intellectual property law openly ne-
glects the interests of developing countries and ignores non-
traditional conceptions of property. Because of the immense invest-
ment western corporations have made in plant genetics and plant ge-
netic research, and of the important potential biotechnology offers 
for increases in global food supply, modification of the system is likely 
to come from within, if at all. 
152 See id. 
153 [d. 
154 See id.; Tracey Henderson, Technology-Protected Seed: A Development Worker's Perspective, 
ECHO DEVELOPMENT NOTES, Dec. 1998, Issue 62, at 5-6. 
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One way to address the myriad of distributive, political, biologi-
cal, and other practical problems described in this Note is to focus on 
the delineation intellectual property law draws between public and 
private goods. In the realm of biotechnological innovations and plant 
genetic resources, more attention must be paid to the importance of 
the public domain: that area of ideas and genetic resources from 
which future innovations are created. The balance in today's intellec-
tual property protection for plant varieties has tipped decisively in fa-
vor of private corporate interests. The dangers this poses are multiple. 
Strong and lengthy intellectual property protections encourage in-
creases in genetic uniformity, increases in market concentration, 
higher costs for farmers, and potentially higher food prices for the 
public.155 Additionally, and importantly, strong intellectual property 
protections begin to fence off portions of the public domain, in this 
case portions of genetic information, thereby making that informa-
tion unavailable to future creators and potentially limiting creators' 
ability to innovate. 
One way to address and limit the dominance of the western seed 
corporations is to reduce the length of time patents extend protection 
to plant varieties. This has the advantage of releasing bio-engineered 
seeds and hybrids to farmers far earlier than under the normal patent 
structure, making plant genetic information more readily available to 
the public and to other plant breeders, and perhaps beneficially 
influencing genetic diversity. However, maintaining some patent pro-
tection, perhaps as much as ten years, also has the advantage of allow-
ing corporations to recoup their research costs and make profits by 
selling licenses and charging a premium for patented goodS. I56 
Good patent policy offers a financial incentive for investment in 
research while still allowing for the circulation of ideas within the 
public realm. The maintaining of equilibrium in the modern patent 
system for living organisms may be achieved by shortening the time 
for which patents extend protection. Addressing the deeper structural 
concerns that intellectual property law poses-how to adequately 
define property, how to compensate developing countries who serve 
as the source of much of the genetic material that is later patented, 
and how to speak about innovations that take place over generations 
rather than in a sudden innovative moment-demands a rethinking 
1&5 See Goss, supra note 36, at 1435. 
156 One estimate has been that plant breeders earn most of the profit from'a new vari-
ety in its first five years. See id. at 1434. 
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of the concept that underlies intellectual property law-that of an 
original or new creation by a transformative individual. It is not likely 
that such deep structural flaws will soon be addressed by lawmakers, 
private interests, or the public. However, given the fragility of global 
plant genetic diversity, and the inability of seed companies to market 
diversity,157 it is essential that a system emerge which controls and pre-
serves genetic diversity. 
CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property law in the international context continues 
to inadequately address the legitimate concerns of developing coun-
tries and indigenous communities about control of their natural and 
cultural resources. In the area of plant genetic resources, intellectual 
property has established a system that treats plant germplasm as a free 
good, and that same germplasm which is then inserted into plant va-
rieties as a commodity deserving of property right protection. There 
are several consequences of this policy: the continuing dependence of 
developing countries on developed countries; the threat of increasing 
genetic uniformity among plants and crops and of decreasing global 
genetic diversity as corporations mass market uniform, high-yield 
seeds; and the consolidation of private ownership of seeds that form 
the basis of the global food supply. The debate is over how to weigh 
public and private rights and wealth. The solution thus far has been to 
tip the scale in favor of free trade and corporate capital. This policy 
has serious ramifications, as well as distributive inequities, that affect 
not only capital and resources, but also genetic diversity and the vi-
ability of the world's plants. At the very least, the formulators of intel-
lectual property law in the field of plant genetic resources must make 
renewed efforts to protect the public domain. In part, this means pro-
tecting the plant genetic diversity that is our common heritage by de-
157 Tilford writes: 
Seed companies cannot market diversity. To protect investment. the seed in-
dustry must have intellectual property protections. To receive protection un-
der the current intellectual property system, seed companies must develop 
uniform products, a task made easier through biotechnology. To financially 
gain from these uniform products, the seed industry must then pursue the 
obvious strategy of mass production of products for a public willing to buy 
them .... Perversely. therefore, the agricultural industry must follow the typi-
cal formula for market success, it must do so by eroding the very pedestal 
upon which its success is built. 
See Tilford, supra note 55, at 444. 
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creasing the strong intellectual property protections corporations 
have been granted. 
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